“If men were angels”: The Constitution and its Protections Against Factions

I had lunch with a friend today, and the conversation sparked the content for this month’s newsletter piece. My friend, who tends to be quite pessimistic about the state of national affairs, advanced the argument that the framers of the Constitution of the United States could not possibly have anticipated the degree to which the two-party system would break down in the face of obstructionism, ill will, and the pursuit of personal gain over the preservation of the common good. Her comments motivated me to write this piece, which I think is appropriately timed for the month of our nation’s celebration of independence. 

After the American Revolution, the newly independent coalition of former colonies formed a loose confederation. In 1777, the former British colonies organized under the Articles of Confederation, which signaled a strong bond among the 13 sovereign states. The idea was that each state would have its own interests, government, and sovereignty – and be beholden to no higher interest or authority. Given the recent experience with Britain, it is understandable that the former colonies would abhor any kind of central control or identity.

By the 1780s, it was clear that this loose confederation of states was ineffective. Unstable economic conditions related to the Revolutionary War impacted some regions more than others, and a lack of coordinated response to alleviate problems led to local rebellion and unrest. The absence of a central government prevented any meaningful counter to uprisings, such as Shays’ Rebellion. Citizens in western Massachusetts took up arms against the government to protest taxes levied to pay for Revolutionary War debt. Other such armed conflicts showed the need for a more centralized way of dealing with problems.

In 1787, delegates met in Philadelphia to develop a constitution. This led to a series of arguments about the role of centralized government and the rights of states. The delegates had widely disparate ideas about what should be included in the Constitution. Three individuals who played an important role in the debates on the Constitution were John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton. These three men wrote and circulated a series of essays now known as The Federalist Papers. Jay, Madison, and Hamilton carefully articulated arguments for a constitution and central government, and addressed the concerns of the Anti-Federalists, those who opposed the erosion of state sovereignty and the concentration of power in the hands of a select few. 

One of the major concerns was the topic of factions. We might be tempted to call factions political parties today, but the definition in the 1700s was more complicated. Factions were groups of people or special interests (whether in the minority or the majority) that represented ideas not in support of the common good (the well-being of larger society). In Madison’s words, “By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” Madison and others worried that factions would divide the country, fracturing the fragile alliances that united the sovereign states. Both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists were concerned that factions presented a danger to society. Madison argued that factions were an innate part of society due to the nature of humankind. In Federalist Paper Number 10, Madison advances the argument that a larger, more diverse republic can curb the evils of factions. A plethora of different interests, as opposed to a society of fewer, more similar interests, would prevent any one special interest from dominating. It would also prevent what Madison referred to as the “tyranny of the majority”, where dissenting opinions are quashed because of a large, vocal majority. A larger, representative government would prevent a violent revolution from spreading from one region to the entire confederation of states: “The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States.” The levers of representative government were designed to keep factions in check. The Bill of Rights spells out limits of federal powers and protects the rights of individuals. The Constitution makes it difficult to amend the document, preventing a simple majority from instituting significant changes. The three branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial) provide checks and balances to curb abuses of power. We can argue as to the effectiveness of various aspects of the structure we have inherited (the Electoral College, the Supreme Court, etc.) but the fact of the matter remains that it is difficult for an inflamed faction to actuate meaningful change given the guard rails of the system. Yes, social media and other factors make the inflamed factions much more vocal and influential in political discourse (“the base” of each party). But the frustration with the lack of legislative action (and this cry occurs regardless of who is in power) is evidence of a system that is designed to slow down those intent on advancing an agenda against the will of the people. It also means that the agenda that advances the will of the people is slowed as well. Slow is built into the system inherently as a part of the guardrail against factions.

The idea of a federal government thus was a way to curb darker tendencies that existed within humankind. If human beings were naturally inclined towards division and pursuing their own interests, federalism served as a check on that inclination, preventing a minority from wreaking havoc in the republic and preventing the majority from silencing voices of disagreement. After Shays’ Rebellion and other similar events, political leaders questioned the nature of humankind, particularly with respect to morality. Before the uprising in Massachusetts, George Washington wrote that “we have probably had too good an opinion of human nature in forming our confederation.” In Federalist Paper Number 51, Madison warns about the need to thwart the darker aspects of human nature, notably ambition: “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interests of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. Bu what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.” 

My friend’s lunchtime comments reminded me of these Federalist debates on the Constitution, most notably the discussions of human nature, factions, and the taint of ambition. The founders certainly did NOT envision a system without obstructionism, ill will, or the pursuit of personal gain over the preservation of the common good. Granted, our society is nothing like that they could have imagined. But in terms of human nature and political ambition, problems of governance, and polarization/division, I think at least a few of the framers had an inkling of what might come to be. Our job is to remember that there is such a thing as the common good. Drucker reminds us of this constantly in his work, and worried that institutions would lose sight of the need to balance their individual, specialized focus on mission and goal with the larger needs of society. I leave you with this quote from Drucker, one of my favorites:

“In our society of pluralistic institutions, each institution must focus on its narrow mission if it is to achieve results and meet the minimum test of social responsibility. But then, who looks out for the common good? The answer is no one unless executives of society’s institutions take on a second responsibility that looks beyond the borders of their institution to the common good.”